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For Sale 
THE THREAT OF STATE PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS TO THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ARTISTIC BUSINESSES 
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought 
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both 
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifty years, the changing landscape of the 
American economy and the continued evolution of state public 
accommodations laws toward protection of a greater number of 
suspect classes in a wider variety of places2 have created an 
environment of potentially widespread First Amendment 
violations.3 Public accommodations laws are the modern 
conception of the common-law principle that innkeepers and 
other common carriers could not refuse service to customers 
without good reason.4 Historically, this principle was a narrow 
  
 1 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invalidating a New 
Hampshire regulation requiring noncommercial vehicles to carry license plates 
inscribed with the State’s motto because it improperly forced individuals to publicly 
disseminate the State’s ideological message). 
 2 Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access 
to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 217 (1978). 
 3 Lauren Rosenblum, Note, Equal Access or Free Speech: The 
Constitutionality of Public Accommodations Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (1997). 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 571 
(1995); Pamela Griffin, Comment, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: 
First Amendment Limitations upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1047 (1985). 
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one,5 but upon codification, many states have significantly 
expanded its scope by increasing both the types of businesses 
subject to the laws and the classes of people protected by them.6  
Public accommodations laws are generally designed to 
ensure equal access for all people to publicly available goods 
and services, even where privately owned businesses offer 
those goods and services.7 The “public character” rationale—
which states that owners of inns, restaurants, and other 
common carriers perform “quasi-public” services while 
operating for a profit—serves as a primary justification for 
abridging individual rights in this context.8 Thus, for a 
business owner to discriminate in choosing his clients would be 
unfair to the public and inconsistent with the owner’s profit 
earning purpose.9 As some commentators explain, “Citizens’ 
rights of access to public places must, therefore, be balanced 
against the right of the owner to control his or her property.”10  
A predicament arises when a business offers inherently 
expressive goods or services, such as photography, music, or 
any other business that involves the commercialization of art.11 
If a customer wishes to hire an artist to provide artwork or 
other similarly expressive services for a cause with which the 
artist does not agree, the artist may be compelled by a state 
public accommodations law to express an idea, or associate 
himself with an idea, with which he does not agree on pain of 
  
 5 Griffin, supra note 4, at 1047-48. 
 6 Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 2, at 218. States tend to define place of 
public accommodation either by listing the types of business the term covers, often 
qualified by language such as “includes but is not limited to,” or by using a general 
definition. For an example of a list form statute, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) 
(McKinney 2010), for an example of a general definition, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) 
(West Supp. 2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, 
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, 
medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are 
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or 
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”); Griffin, supra note 
4, at 1052-53 (“Protection under state law is afforded not only from discrimination 
based upon race, creed, color, religion, and national origin, but also from discrimination 
upon the bases of sex, age or disability, and in some states, marital status, personal 
appearance and sexual preference.”). 
 7 Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 2, at 218. 
 8 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571 (explaining that “‘innkeepers are a sort of public 
servants’”) (quoting Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 219, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N.P. 
1835)); Griffin, supra note 4, at 1055. 
 9 Griffin, supra note 4, at 1055. 
 10 Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 2, at 218. 
 11 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First 
Amendment protection.”); Griffin, supra note 4, at 1048. 
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civil sanctions. This compelled expression or association likely 
violates the artist’s First Amendment rights.12  
A recent example is illustrative of the conflict. In the 
fall of 2006, Vanessa Willock and Misti Collinsworth sought a 
photographer for their same-sex commitment ceremony.13 
Willock contacted Elaine Huguenin, co-owner and primary 
photographer of Elane Photography,14 through the company’s 
website seeking services.15 Huguenin declined to provide 
service.16 As an artist, Huguenin believed she expressed herself 
through her photographs and became part of the events that 
she photographed.17 For Huguenin to photograph a same-sex 
ceremony would express an idea contrary to her belief that 
marriage exists only between two individuals of the opposite 
sex.18 Willock filed a discrimination claim against Elane 
Photography with the New Mexico Human Rights Division. 
After an investigation, the Human Rights Commission found 
Elane Photography guilty of discrimination under the New 
Mexico public accommodations law, the Human Rights Act, 
§ 28-1-7(F),19 and awarded Willock $6,637.94 in attorney’s 
fees.20 The District Court for the Second Judicial District of 
New Mexico affirmed on appeal.21 Neither the Human Rights 
Commission nor the district court gave significant consideration 
to Huguenin’s freedom of expression argument.22 
  
 12 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see also W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”); see also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (“[A] 
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”); Eugene Volokh, Compelling Speech 
by Commercial Photographers, Freelance Writers, Musicians, and So On, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 16, 2009, 4:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/16/compelling-speech-by-
commercial-photographers-freelance-writers-musicians-and-so-on/. 
 13 Willock v. Elane Photography, Inc., HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 4 
(N.M. Human Rights Comm’n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/ 
willockopinion.pdf. 
 14 Elaine Huguenin’s studio’s name is spelled without an “i.” 
 15 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 4. 
 16 Id. at 5.  
 17 Id. at 6. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 14. 
 20 Id. at 19. 
 21 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, CV-2008-06632, slip op. at 14 (N.M.2d 
Jud. Dist. Ct. 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-
LLC-v-Vanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009. 
 22 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 16-17; Willock, CV-2008-06632, 
slip op. at 8-10. Just prior to going to press, the Court of Appeals for the State of New 
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The Elane Photography case is interesting for two reasons. 
First, when First Amendment principles are applied, it appears 
that Huguenin’s free speech defense was stronger than either the 
Commission or the district court acknowledged. Second, it calls 
into question the constitutionality of state public accommodations 
laws generally as applied to an enormous class of businesses.23  
Part I of this note will summarize the Elane Photography 
case and its appeal to the New Mexico district court. Part II will 
demonstrate how the New Mexico Human Rights Act was 
unconstitutional as applied to Elane Photography under current 
First Amendment doctrine due to a gradual shift in jurisprudence 
toward greater First Amendment protection. In Part III, a brief 
discussion of public accommodations laws generally will show the 
seriousness of the potential conflict between these laws and the 
First Amendment freedom of expression24 and will discuss several 
suggested solutions to the problem.  
I. WILLOCK V. ELANE PHOTOGRAPHY 
A. The Facts 
Elane Photography is a limited liability company co-
owned by husband and wife Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin25 
and operates in Albuquerque, New Mexico.26 Elaine Huguenin 
(Huguenin) was the studio’s primary photographer and Jonathan 
Huguenin was the business manager.27 The business provided 
photography services primarily for weddings and engagements 
  
Mexico handed down its decision on Elane Photography’s appeal from the district court. 
Like the district court, the Court of Appeals rejected the Huguenins’ First Amendment 
arguments. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Huguenin’s photography was not 
sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection and, therefore, the 
State could constitutionally apply the New Mexico public accommodations statute to 
Huguenin’s conduct. Elane Photography v. Willock, No. 30,203, at ¶ 29 (N.M. Ct. App. 
May 31, 2012). Further, to the extent Huguenin did produce expression, the Court of 
Appeals agreed with the district court that Huguenin was a mere conduit of her clients’ 
messages. Id. Because the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision and 
reasoning on Huguenin’s First Amendment argument, the analysis and reasoning in 
this note remain relevant. 
 23 This note is limited to discussion of state public accommodations laws only; 
the federal public accommodations law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006), embodied in Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 24 To the extent that Elane Photography implicates other First Amendment 
concerns, such as the free exercise of religion, or claims arising under state law other 
than public accommodations law, such as the New Mexico Constitution or the New 
Mexico Religious Freedom Reformation Act (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 (2000)), those 
issues are not addressed by this note.  
 25 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 2. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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and also for its customers’ significant life events.28 The business 
had a website which featured sample wedding pictures taken by 
Huguenin and advertised the studio’s services.29 Huguenin’s 
initial contact with most clients was via e-mail through the 
website.30 After meeting with a potential client and agreeing to 
go forward, Huguenin would provide a written contract in 
which the company explicitly retained all rights with regard to 
the prints and proofs of the photographs, including the right to 
use them for “advertising, display or any other purpose thought 
proper by [t]he Studio.”31  
In the fall of 2006, Vanessa Willock (Willock) and Misti 
Collinsworth (Collinsworth)32 were seeking a photographer to 
record their same-sex commitment ceremony.33 On September 
21, 2006, Willock e-mailed Huguenin after contacting the Elane 
Photography website, and specified in her e-mail that she 
needed a photographer for a same-gender ceremony.34 Within a 
day, Huguenin replied with the ambiguous statement that “[a]s 
a company, we photograph traditional weddings, engagements, 
seniors, and several other things,” but did not give Willock a 
definite answer whether Elane Photography would take the 
job.35 Approximately two months later, Willock sent another e-
mail in order to clarify whether Elane Photography would 
serve same-sex couples.36 In her second reply, Huguenin 
responded, “[W]e do not photograph same-sex weddings.”37  
Upset by what appeared to be discrimination, the couple 
decided to confirm that the studio refused to serve them because 
of their sexual orientation.38 To that end, Collinsworth sent an e-
mail requesting Elane Photography’s services without disclosing 
that she was having a same-sex ceremony or that she was 
Willock’s partner.39 Huguenin responded affirmatively with all 
the information Collinsworth requested and offered to set up a 
meeting to discuss the job in person.40 As a result of these 
events, Willock filed a discrimination claim with the Human 
  
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 3. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 4 (quoting testimony of Elaine Huguenin and Jonathan Huguenin; Ex. A).  
 32 Known at the time of the events as Misti Pascottini. Id. at 4, 7. 
 33 Id. at 4. 
 34 Id. at 5. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 6. 
 39 Id. at 6, 7.  
 40 Id. at 7.  
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Rights Division41 of the New Mexico Department of Labor42 
against Elane Photography on December 20, 2006.  
B. The Human Rights Commission 
In its Decision and Final Order, the New Mexico Human 
Rights Commission (the Commission)43 made a number of 
significant findings of fact based on the testimony of the parties. 
Among other facts, the Commission found that “Elane 
Photography also had an unwritten company policy, which was 
shared between its co-owners, [the Huguenins], that Elane 
Photography would not photograph any image or event which 
was contrary to the religious beliefs of its co-owners.”44 
Huguenin held the religious belief that marriage could only be 
between individuals of the opposite sex.45 The photographer also 
believed that “as an artist, [Huguenin] became a part of the 
events which she photographed and an owner of the images or 
messages conveyed in her photographs.”46 She therefore declined 
to provide her services to Willock because to do so would help 
convey a message that was contrary to her religious beliefs.47  
Willock’s claim asserted that Elane Photography’s denial 
of service violated section 28-1-7(F) of the New Mexico Human 
Rights Act.48 The statute states that it is unlawful 
discrimination for “any person in any public accommodation to 
make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in offering or refusing 
to offer its services, facilities, accommodation or goods to any 
person because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, spousal affiliation or 
  
 41 Currently the Human Rights Bureau. Id. at 8. 
 42 Currently the New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions. Id. at 8. 
 43 On its Frequently Asked Questions page, the New Mexico Department of 
Workforce Solutions explains: 
The Human Rights Commission is comprised of eleven citizens appointed by the 
governor to conduct hearings involving discrimination complaints. The eleven 
members volunteer their services and are not employees of the state. A 
commission hearing may be conducted by a single hearing officer or a three-
member panel. The final decision in every case is made by a three-member panel 
either on cases the panel has heard or recommendations form [sic] the hearing 
officer.  
Human Rights, N.M. DEP’T WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, http://www.wia.state.nm.us/HR-
FAQ.html#HRCommission (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).  
 44 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 4.  
 45 Id. at 6.  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. at 10.  
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physical or mental handicap.”49 The Commission found that the 
e-mail correspondence between Willock and Huguenin 
established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of 
the statute because Huguenin made a distinction in offering 
the services provided by Elane Photography based on Willock’s 
sexual orientation.50 Elane Photography submitted two 
defenses to the charge. First, Elane Photography challenged 
the application of section 28-1-7 to the business on the grounds 
that Elane Photography was not a “public accommodation.”51 
Specifically, Elane Photography asserted that it was exempt 
from application of the statute because “a business entity of an 
expressive or artistic nature . . . [does] not meet the statutory 
definition of a ‘public accommodation’ under the [New Mexico 
Human Rights Act].”52 Second, Elane Photography argued that, 
even if it were a public accommodation subject to the New 
Mexico Human Rights Act, the Act was preempted by the First 
Amendment, which protected Elane Photography’s rights to free 
exercise of religion and free speech, including its right to refuse 
photographic service for those reasons.53 Elane Photography 
failed to assert any of the various exemptions to the statute 
expressly contained in section 28-1-9.54  
Based on its investigation, the Commission found that 
Elane Photography qualified as a public accommodation, 
because it was registered as a limited liability company, held 
itself open to the public by soliciting business through its 
website, and openly sold its services to the public.55 The 
Commission also rejected Elane Photography’s contention that 
expressive and artistic businesses are exempt from liability 
under section 28-1-7(F), because the statute provides no 
express exemption for such businesses.56  
In addressing Elane Photography’s First Amendment 
defenses, the Commission relied generally on Supreme Court 
precedent upholding the constitutionality of provisions similar 
  
 49 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2011). “‘[P]ublic accommodation’ means any 
establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to 
the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or other place or establishment 
that is by its nature and use distinctly private.” Id. § 28-1-2(H). Willock, HRD No. 06-
12-20-0685, slip op. at 10. 
 50 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 14. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 15. 
 53 Id. at 14.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 15, 16. 
 56 Id. at 15. 
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to section 28-1-7(F).57 The Commission explained that such 
provisions are justified because the State has a compelling 
interest in preventing “acts of invidious discrimination in the 
distribution of publicly available goods [and] services.”58 
However, the Commission clarified that two important issues 
were not before the Commission for determination and were 
beyond the scope of the opinion. Those issues included the 
constitutionality of the New Mexico Human Rights Act and the 
preemption of the Act by the United States Constitution or other 
state law, including the New Mexico Constitution and the New 
Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act.59 Therefore, the 
decision of the Commission was limited to a finding that 
Willock had made out a prima facie antidiscrimination claim 
under section 28-1-7(F)60 and that Elane Photography failed to 
assert a valid exemption to the statute or otherwise rebut 
Willock’s showing.61 The Commission awarded Willock $6,637.94 
in attorney’s fees and costs.62 Under section 28-1-11(E), Willock 
was entitled to actual damages under the statute as well as 
attorney’s fees.63 However, Willock declined to seek actual 
damages, even though she was given the opportunity to show 
proof of such damages at the hearing.64  
C. The Appeal 
Elane Photography appealed the Human Rights 
Commission’s decision to the Second Judicial District Court of 
the State of New Mexico (the district court). In its appeal, Elane 
Photography asked the district court to reverse the 
Commission’s judgment because the judgment violated Elane 
Photography’s First Amendment rights of free exercise of 
religion and freedom of expression (including freedom from 
  
 57 Id. at 17.  
 58 Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).  
 59 See id. at 18. 
 60 See id. at 14. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. at 19. 
 63  
Upon the conclusion of a hearing conducted by a hearing officer, the hearing 
officer shall prepare a written report setting forth proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and recommending the action to be taken by the 
commission. . . . As part of its order, the commission may require the respondent 
to pay actual damages to the complainant and to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-11(E) (2011).  
 64 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 18. 
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compelled expression).65 Elane Photography also revived its 
argument that the business was not a public accommodation 
and therefore not subject to section 28-1-7, and it contended that 
its conduct was not discriminatory.66  
The district court issued its opinion on the parties’ cross 
motions for summary judgment on December 11, 2009. Finding 
no issue of material fact, the court denied Elane Photography’s 
motion for summary judgment and granted Willock’s motion.67 
The district court found, as a matter of law, that Elane 
Photography was a public accommodation.68 Similarly, the 
district court affirmed the Commission’s finding that there was 
direct evidence of discrimination on Huguenin’s part, because 
Elane Photography had a policy to distinguish between opposite-
sex couples and same-sex couples in providing wedding 
photography services.69  
Next, the district court found that the Commission’s 
application of the New Mexico Human Rights Act did not 
violate Elane Photography’s freedom of expression.70 The 
district court began its analysis by distinguishing Supreme 
Court precedent that supported Elane Photography’s position, 
which stood for the proposition that various art forms, including 
“pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings[,]” enjoyed 
full First Amendment protection because of their communicative 
nature.71 By characterizing Elane Photography as a case dealing 
only with restrictions on who can buy artwork after the artist 
has offered it for sale, rather than with restrictions on the 
artwork’s dissemination, the district court found the precedent’s 
reasoning to be inapposite.72 Further distinguishing the 
precedent, the district court pointed out the fact that Huguenin, 
as a hired photographer, did not choose the content of her own 
work, whereas the precedential cases all involved an artist whose 
works contained content of their own choosing or creation.73  
Like the Commission, the district court made a point of 
noting that nondiscrimination laws, such as New Mexico’s public 
  
 65 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights Comm’n 
at 5, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (June 30, 2008), available 
at http://www.scottfillmer.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ElanePhotoAppeal.pdf.  
 66 Id. 
 67 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, CV-2008-06632 (N.M.2d Jud. Dist. Ct. 
2009).  
 68 Id. at 6. 
 69 See id. at 8.  
 70 See id. at 11.  
 71 Id. at 8.  
 72 See id.  
 73 Id.  
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accommodations law, are generally constitutional.74 Further 
analyzing Supreme Court precedent finding state compulsion of 
speech unconstitutional,75 the district court found that, as a 
commercial photographer, Huguenin’s only message was “fine 
photography of special moments.”76 Thus, application of state 
public accommodations law was not an impermissible compulsion 
of an individual to affirm or disseminate the state’s ideological 
message, as a requirement to salute the flag or to carry the state 
motto on a license plate would be.77 Furthermore, the district 
court asserted that Huguenin was far from a communicator of 
artistic expression.78 Rather, the photographer was merely a 
conduit for her clients’ messages and thus was not afforded any 
constitutional protection from compelled speech, since no 
message of her own was affected by application of the statute.79 
II. A FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION  
Two distinct, but related, lines of First Amendment 
doctrine are applicable to Elane Photography: the compelled 
expression doctrine and the compelled expressive association 
doctrine. These doctrines independently demonstrate that the 
application of New Mexico’s public accommodations statute to 
Elane Photography80 was an unconstitutional compulsion of 
speech.  
A. The Compelled Speech Doctrine 
Applying section 28-1-7(F) to Elane Photography is a 
violation of the Huguenins’ First Amendment right to be free 
from compelled speech.81 It is a well-established principle of 
  
 74 Id. at 9 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 
U.S. 557, 572 (1995)).  
 75 See id. at 10 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)).  
 76 Id. at 11.  
 77 Id. at 10.  
 78 Id. at 11.  
 79 Id.  
 80 In the interest of clarity, for the duration of the paper, no distinction will 
be made between “Elane Photography” the business and “Elaine Huguenin” the 
individual. Because corporations have the same First Amendment rights as 
individuals, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), this will not affect the 
integrity of the legal analysis.  
 81 Indeed, this was Professor Eugene Volokh’s first reaction to the Human Rights 
Commission’s decision on April 9, 2008, even before he had read the opinion. In a post on his 
eponymous blog, Professor Volokh posited that, by applying the public accommodation 
statute to photography-as-art, the State of New Mexico may have run afoul of the First 
Amendment prohibition against compelled speech as articulated in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
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constitutional law that the First Amendment freedom of speech 
includes the right to choose what not to say.82 The right not to 
speak is most famously set forth in two Supreme Court cases, 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley 
v. Maynard.83  
1. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 
In Barnette, the Court struck down a West Virginia 
Board of Education resolution84 requiring all students to salute 
the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.85 The first step in 
the Court’s analysis was to find that a flag salute and recital of 
the Pledge constituted expression for the purposes of the First 
Amendment.86 There was no question that the flag salute and 
pledge together constituted expression, because the ceremony 
was both “a compulsion of students to declare a belief” and a 
“require[d] affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.”87 That 
students were actually compelled to participate in the recital was 
  
U.S. 705 (1977) and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). Eugene Volokh, Photographers Denied the Freedom to Choose What They 
Photograph, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 9, 2008, 2:03 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/04/09/ 
photographers-denied-the-freedom-to-choose-what-they-photograph/. 
 82 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.”); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (“[T]he right of 
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”); Harper & 
Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“The essential thrust of 
the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public 
expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish 
him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant 
freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of 
speech in its affirmative aspect” (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 
244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968))). 
 83 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. 
 84 The text of the resolution, in pertinent part, stated:  
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virginia Board of Education does 
hereby recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the 
United States . . . now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in the 
public schools, supported in whole or in part by public funds, and that all 
teachers as defined by law in West Virginia and pupils in such schools shall be 
required to participate in the salute, honoring the Nation represented by the 
Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act of 
insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.2.  
 85 Id. at 642. 
 86 Id. at 632 (“There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges the flag 
salute is a form of utterance.”). 
 87 Id. at 632-33. 
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equally clear since refusal to comply was treated as 
insubordination and punished with expulsion pending 
compliance.88 Because the notion that the government could 
compel an individual to affirm an opinion or belief was anathema 
to the Court, the Court indicated that such a compulsion would be 
constitutional only if it passed an even higher standard than that 
applicable to government restrictions of speech.89  
The opinion then went on to analyze and overrule 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, decided just three years 
earlier, which held that schools could condition access to public 
schools on participation in the flag pledge and salute.90 The 
Court rejected what it termed “the heart” of the Gobitis 
decision—the false premise that because “[n]ational unity is 
the basis of national security,” the government had authority to 
institute compulsory measures to achieve that goal.91 The First 
Amendment’s purpose is to guard against any such coercion of 
thought.92 By setting this clear boundary, the First Amendment 
prevents the slippery slope that begins with persuasion toward 
national unity and quickly devolves into compulsion of thought 
and then extermination of dissenters.93 Thus, the Court reasoned, 
although the state’s interest in promoting national unity was 
legitimate, that interest did not justify a compulsion of speech.94  
The Barnette decision therefore established the method 
for analyzing instances of government-compelled speech under 
the First Amendment. First analyze whether a law has the 
effect of eliciting some sort of expression, then decide whether 
the expression amounts to a “declaration” or “affirmation” of 
belief. If there are sanctions for noncompliance with the 
statute, an impermissible compulsion will be found and will 
  
 88 In fact, not only were the children punished, but parents of non-complying 
children were also sanctioned. The children’s absence for insubordination was treated 
as unlawful delinquency, for which parents were subject to a fine and jail time, if 
convicted. Id. at 629.  
 89 Id. at 633-34 (“It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of 
expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression 
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to 
prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded 
only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here the power of 
compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag 
salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to 
muffle expression.”). 
 90 Id. at 642; see Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940). 
 91 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.  
 92 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 93 Id. at 641. 
 94 Id. at 640.  
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possibly be an even greater First Amendment harm than a 
restriction of speech.95  
2. Wooley v. Maynard 
In Wooley, the Supreme Court confronted a very different 
set of facts than those of Barnette but struck down a state law on 
much the same reasoning. As Jehovah’s Witnesses, George and 
Maxine Maynard felt the New Hampshire state motto, “Live 
Free or Die,” directly contravened their religious and moral 
beliefs.96 In an attempt not to disseminate the objectionable 
message, the Maynards began to cover the portion of their 
license plate where the motto was displayed.97 After being found 
guilty three times for violating a New Hampshire statute 
prohibiting the covering up of any letter or number on a state-
issued license plate, Maynard brought a civil rights action under 
§ 1983 for declaratory relief and to enjoin enforcement of this 
and another statute requiring that the license plates for all 
noncommercial vehicles bear the New Hampshire motto.98  
At the outset of its analysis, the Court framed the issue 
as “whether the State may constitutionally require an 
individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological 
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner 
and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the 
public.”99 Thus, much of the Barnette analysis was already 
satisfied, since the court implicitly found the New Hampshire 
statute required individuals to express a message. By directly 
analogizing the license plate statute to the requirement in 
Barnette to salute and pledge the flag, the Court reasoned that 
the New Hampshire statute co-opted the Maynards’ private 
property as a “mobile billboard” for the state’s own message.100 
Even if passively carrying the license plate on one’s car was not 
as great a First Amendment harm as requiring active 
affirmation of a belief through speech and conduct, the Court 
nevertheless found the requirement was not constitutional.101 
As in Barnette, the statutes at issue carried a penalty for 
  
 95 Id. at 633.  
 96 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).  
 97 Id. at 707-08.  
 98 The statute prohibiting the covering up of any letters or numbers was 
interpreted to include the State motto. Id. at 708-09. 
 99 Id. at 713.  
 100 Id. at 715.  
 101 Id. at 717.  
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noncompliance.102 Also as in Barnette, the Court rounded out its 
reasoning by inquiring into “whether the State’s countervailing 
interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees 
to display the state motto on their license plates.”103 The Court 
determined the state’s first interest—easily identifying 
passenger vehicles—did not justify the infringement on drivers’ 
rights because such an interest could be achieved by more 
narrowly tailored means that did not so “broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties.”104 More importantly, the 
state’s second interest—fostering state pride—did not justify 
an infringement of rights because, “where the State’s interest 
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to 
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First 
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
message.”105 
3. Elane Photography Is a Case of Compelled Speech 
As Barnette and Wooley explain, the analysis for the 
compelled speech doctrine has two steps. First, analyze whether 
a state law, regulation, or policy compels citizens to express or 
affirm a belief that they do not themselves hold. Then, ask 
whether the state’s interest in enforcing that law is compelling 
so that it justifies such a great constitutional harm. Under this 
analysis, it is likely that forcing Huguenin to take photographs 
of ceremonies that she believes are inherently wrong is a form 
of compelled speech. The Supreme Court recognizes artistic 
expression, including photography, as protected by the First 
Amendment, and it is unclear whether any legitimate state 
interest would justify this compulsion.  
a. Photography as Speech  
As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether 
there is expression compelled by a statute that compels 
expression in a way prohibited by the First Amendment.106 The 
  
 102 Appellee George Maynard was issued a citation for cutting the words “or Die” 
off his plate and taping over the resulting hole as well as the words “Live Free.” At a 
hearing, a trial judge fined him $25, but suspended the fine so long as he complied with 
the statute going forward. Maynard was fined $50, ordered to pay the original $25 fine, 
and sentenced to fifteen days in jail upon violating the statute a second time. Id. at 708. 
 103 Id. at 716. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 717.  
 106 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).  
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protection of speech on political issues or issues of public 
concern is at the core of the First Amendment.107 The fight over 
marriage is not just over sincere religious and moral beliefs but 
also about entitlement to “legal, financial, and social benefits” 
the government affords married couples.108 The issue of 
marriage itself has been a public issue since before the United 
States existed.109 Further, the growing national Defense of 
Marriage movement opposing same sex marriage in recent 
years demonstrates that same-sex marriage specifically is an 
issue of political concern.110 In 2003, Massachusetts became the 
first state to allow marriages between individuals of the same 
sex.111 Currently, a majority of states, including New Mexico, do 
not allow same-sex marriage.112 In the past decade, there have 
been several high-profile attempts to overturn bans, and to pass 
new legislation achieving marriage equality for same-sex 
couples, several of which were successful.113 Therefore, 
  
 107 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First 
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (The First Amendment “was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”).  
 108 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 109 The First interracial marriage ban in the Colonies was enacted by 
Maryland in 1661. Marriage continued to be regulated as a matter of national concern 
through the early twentieth century. Aderson Bellegarde François, As Iowa Goes, So 
Goes The Nation: Varnum v. Brien and Its Impact on Marriage Rights for Same-Sex 
Couples: Symposium Article: To Go into Battle with Space and Time: Emancipated 
Slave Marriage, Interracial Marriage, and Same-Sex Marriage, 13 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 105, 113 (2009).  
 110 For a discussion of this movement, see Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. 
Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 272-74 (2006).  
 111 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (finding that the Massachusetts Constitution 
prohibits treating same-sex couples differently than opposite-sex couples for the 
purposes of the state’s marriage statute).  
 112 New Mexico currently has no provision addressing same-sex marriage. See 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-1 to -4 (2010). On January 4, 2011, the Office of New Mexico 
Attorney General Gary King released an opinion letter concluding that, “While we 
cannot predict how a New Mexico court would rule on this issue . . . it is our opinion 
that a same-sex marriage that is valid under the laws of the country or state where it 
was consummated would likewise be found valid in New Mexico.” N.M. Validity for Same-
Sex Marriages Performed in Other Jurisdictions, Op. N.M. Att’y Gen., Gary K. King, No. 
11-01 (2011), available at http://www.nmag.gov/pdf/4%20Jan%2011-Rep.%20Al%20Park-
Opinion%2011-01%5B1%5D.pdf. 
 113 As of March 2012, eight states and the District of Columbia allow same-sex 
marriage: Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, 
Vermont, and Washington. Other states prohibit same-sex unions, but provide all or some 
legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. In February 2012, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit declared California’s ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012); see 
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expression on the issue of same-sex marriage deserves full First 
Amendment protection.114 
That the expression is in the form of photography, or, 
rather, a decision not to photograph, does not lessen the 
expression’s degree of protection. It has long been recognized 
that the Constitution protects various forms of expression, 
including most art forms.115 Photography specifically has been 
identified as art that falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment.116 Further, the Supreme Court has decided that, 
in addition to its protected status as a medium for the content 
it expresses, art is protected for its own sake because of its 
inherent expressive character.117 As the Court has explained,  
[C]onstitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political 
significance that may be attributable to such productions, though 
they may indeed comment on the political, but simply on their 
expressive character, which falls within a spectrum of protected 
“speech” extending outward from the core of overtly political 
declarations. Put differently, art is entitled to full protection because 
our “cultural life,” just like our native politics, “rest[s] upon [the] 
ideal]” of governmental viewpoint neutrality.118 
Thus, Elaine Huguenin’s photographs should be protected as 
expression under the First Amendment for conveying a message 
on a prominent social and political issue and as artistic works.119  
Further, the mere fact that clients may commission and 
pay for Huguenin’s photography does not diminish its 
expressive ability or First Amendment protection.120 There is a 
  
also Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN 
(July 6, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_ 
Map(1).pdf (periodically updated information on the current status of same-sex union laws 
by state). For a discussion of the fight for recognition of same-sex unions on the state 
level, see David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and 
Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115 (2010).  
 114 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is 
‘at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion))).  
 115 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602-03 (1998) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this 
First Amendment protection.”). 
 116 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (“Pictures, films, 
paintings, drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection”).  
 117 Finley, 524 U.S. at 602-03 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 118 Id. at 602-03 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).  
 119 Id.  
 120 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that 
otherwise constitutionally protected expression does not lose its First Amendment 
protection merely because it was bought and paid for); Griffin, supra note 4, at 1062 
(“The Supreme Court clearly has rejected the significance of profit motive to [First 
Amendment] claims, indicating that this basis for regulation would be incompatible 
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long tradition of patronage in the arts and some of the most 
lauded classical artwork was produced on commission.121 Nor 
are the photographs subject to lesser constitutional protection 
as mere commercial speech.122 Commercial speech is speech 
that proposes a commercial transaction, such as flyers 
advertising the sale of goods, not speech that was 
commissioned from a provider by a client.123  
Because art, even if bought and commissioned, has 
protection as expression under the First Amendment, the facts 
of Elane Photography likely lead to a compelled speech problem 
under Barnette and Wooley. To be sure, one could argue that 
commercial photographers merely capture a memorable moment 
and contain little, if any, actual expression. But that argument 
contradicts both case law and reason. As discussed, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that art is an inherently expressive 
medium, whatever the purpose behind its creation.124 The fact 
  
with the first amendment. That conclusion requires only the recognition that 
newspapers and books are sold for profit . . . .”). 
  Professor Eugene Volokh poses a hypothetical to demonstrate this point:  
Say you’re a freelance writer, who holds himself out as a business offering to 
perform a service. Someone tries to hire you to write materials—press releases, 
Web site materials, and the like—for his same-sex marriage planning company, 
or his Scientology book distribution company, or whatever else. May the 
government force you, on pain of damages liability, to write those materials, 
even if you would prefer not to because of the sexual orientation, religion, or 
whatever else to which the materials would be related? Or do you have a First 
Amendment right to choose which words you write and which you decline to 
write? If you do have such a right, why shouldn’t Elaine Huguenin have the 
same right as a photographer? 
Eugene Volokh, First Amendment and Photography/Writing/Publishing/Book Distribution 
for Money, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 9, 2008, 3:07 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/04/09/first-
amendment-and-photographywritingpublishingbook-distribution-for-money/. 
 121 Books and newspapers are also sold for profit, yet are accorded full 
constitutional protection. Griffin, supra note 4, at 1062; Volokh, supra note 81; Volokh, 
supra note 120. 
 122 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (affirming “the 
proposal of a commercial transaction as ‘the test for identifying commercial speech’”); 
see also Volokh, supra note 120. 
 123 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 
(finding that an advertisement that a newspaper was paid to publish was not 
commercial speech, and thereby subject to less First Amendment protection, merely 
because the newspaper was paid to publish it). Even if this could be considered 
commercial speech, it is not clear that it would receive less constitutional protection as 
a result. In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503-08 (1996), the Supreme 
Court appears to have ratcheted up the scrutiny restrictions commercial speech must 
pass in order to be permissible. Although the Court did not formally declare they were 
giving commercial speech full constitutional protection, its application of higher 
scrutiny implies the law is moving towards greater protection for commercial speech. 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, A Brief History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine (With Some 
Implications for Tobacco Regulation), 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 111 (2010). 
 124 See supra notes 115-22. 
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that there is comparatively more expression in an Ansel Adams 
photograph than in one taken by Elaine Huguenin, in any case 
debatable, is a question of degree that does not change the fact 
that expression exists, even if it is just the expression of a 
celebratory moment from a particular perspective.125  
One could also argue that the expression is not the 
photographer’s own message, but rather that of the clients or 
subjects of the photograph. It is certainly the case that clients 
have their own views of the celebrated event, and it is possible 
that the photographer incorporates those views into her 
photographs as she takes them. But that is not necessarily the 
case, nor does that preclude the photographer’s own expression 
from being simultaneously produced. The difficulty in 
commercialized-art-public-accommodations cases is that the 
main purpose of the expression is to provide a service to clients. 
However, to raise the question is not to answer it. Providing a 
service and creating expression are not mutually exclusive 
activities. It may even be the case that clients seek particular 
service providers specifically because the messages they project 
through their services is one the clients desire to support. This is 
a common phenomenon, observable in every neighborhood 
where environmentally friendly dry cleaners and free trade 
coffee shops flourish.126 Whether it is the case here that 
Huguenin’s photography contained expression that was her 
own depends on the extent of the artistic involvement in 
creating the finished image. Huguenin asserts in her appeal to 
the district court that “it takes great skill, planning and 
aesthetic judgment to create a photograph,”127 which is 
probably accurate to a greater or lesser extent, depending on 
the circumstances. It stands to reason that the photographer 
exercises the skill, planning, and aesthetic judgment when a 
photograph is taken, rather than the commissioner of the 
  
 125 Volokh, supra note 81. 
 126 See Richard A. Epstein, Articles and Essays: The Constitutional Perils of 
Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CALIF. L. REV. 119, 140 (2000) (arguing 
that it is nearly impossible to draw the line between expressive and non-expressive 
corporations today); id. (“[I]t is sheer fantasy to assume that any successful 
organization fits this odd caricature of the firm [whose sole goal is profit], and is wholly 
indifferent to how it is perceived in the external world or by its own staff. It is 
commonplace to speak of ‘corporate cultures’ and to understand that these refer to the 
way in which particular firms position themselves in the many markets, internal and 
external, in which they do business.”).  
 127 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights 
Commission at 3, Willock v. Elane Photography, Inc., HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. 
Human Rights Comm’n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/ 
userdocs/ElanePhotoAppeal.pdf. 
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photograph or its subject. If Huguenin actively formed the 
content of the photograph through her artistic manipulation of 
the medium, then the photograph likely contained her own 
expressive interpretation of the scene. Thus, Huguenin was 
probably not merely a conduit for her clients’ messages, as the 
district court found.128  
Finally, the fact that Huguenin’s expressive photography 
does not itself contain a specific message is not an issue under 
the compelled speech doctrine. The violation occurs when an 
individual is forced to utter or affirm a belief not her own.129 
There is no requirement that the individual has already 
expressed a view to the contrary.  
Other facts of the case further support the conclusion 
that the expression in the photographs was Huguenin’s rather 
than her clients’. Not only did Huguenin produce the physical 
photos from the negatives she shot, Huguenin also retained 
ownership rights to all the images in the photographs.130 The 
images themselves were like her personal property, similar to 
George Maynard’s car in Wooley. To force Huguenin to include 
images that conflict with her beliefs in her photographs is 
similar to forcing a driver to carry an unwanted ideological 
message on his license plate.131 The analogy is not perfect 
because, unlike in Wooley, the expression itself is being co-
opted, rather than an object with no inherently expressive 
nature. Therefore, the facts are closer to Barnette where the 
violation was based on active expression of a contrary belief, 
rather than Wooley’s more passive, forced dissemination. 
Requiring a photographer, on pain of civil sanction, to portray 
certain events in a positive light that she believes should not be 
so portrayed is essentially forcing her to support or adopt an 
idea not her own. This is similar to obliging a child to affirm a 
belief through recitation of a pledge, on pain of punishment, 
with which she does not agree.132 Because of this compelled 
  
 128 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632, 11 ¶ 25 (N.M.2d 
Jud. Dist. Ct. 2009).  
 129 See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 130 Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 4 (quoting testimony of Elaine 
Huguenin and Jonathan Huguenin; Ex. A), available at http://volokh.com/ 
files/willockopinion.pdf. 
 131 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713. 
 132 Even if taking photographs involved no artistic skill or choices of light 
effect, perspective, angle, speed or layout, generic retail photography may still be 
protected by the First Amendment. Professor Eugene Volokh explains:  
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action, applying the public accommodations law may be an 
even greater infringement on Huguenin’s First Amendment 
rights than that found in Wooley.133  
b. State’s Interest in Compelling Speech 
The second prong of the compelled speech analysis 
investigates whether the state interest served by the infringing 
action justifies such a grave First Amendment violation.134 The 
Court has held that a state’s legitimate interest in promoting 
national unity,135 or in facilitating state enforcement of its 
laws,136 cannot justify compelling expression. Indeed, “where 
the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter 
how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an 
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the 
courier for such message.”137 Because enforcing the New Mexico 
public accommodations law against Elane Photography would 
coerce individual promotion of the state’s ideological message, 
it would be absurd if the state’s interest in disseminating that 
ideological message could justify the constitutional violation 
that coercive dissemination would cause.138 To hold otherwise 
would undermine the primary purpose behind the First 
  
I suppose that some will say that writing press releases or Web pages on 
commission isn’t really literary or political, the way that writing fiction or 
opinion columns is . . . . Yet I take it that even being compelled to write bland, 
relatively generic copy about the virtues of some same-sex marriage planning 
company would be seen as a speech compulsion. Why wouldn’t being compelled 
to take bland, relatively generic photographs likewise qualify (especially since 
taking and selecting good photos does involve at least some artistic 
decisionmaking)?  
Eugene Volokh, Legal Requirements that You Write Things or Create Photographs, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 9, 2008, 7:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/04/09/legal-
requirements-that-you-write-things-or-create-photographs/. 
 133 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713; id. at 715 (“Compelling the affirmative act of a 
flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the 
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is 
essentially one of degree.”). 
 134 Id. at 716 (After finding the petitioner’s First Amendment rights are 
implicated, the Court “must also determine whether the State’s countervailing interest 
is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring [the compelled expression].”). 
 135 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).  
 136 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716. 
 137 Id. at 717. 
 138 David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 
MO. L. REV. 83, 101 (2001). 
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Amendment—to protect expression of individual belief, 
irrespective of content, against government interference.139  
Nevertheless, in the closely analogous compelled 
association cases, the Supreme Court has found that the 
interest of eliminating discrimination is sufficient to justify 
infringement on First Amendment rights.140 The elimination of 
discrimination is a primary purpose of public accommodations 
laws,141 and it was the compelling justification cited by the New 
Mexico Human Rights Commission for rejecting Huguenin’s 
First Amendment defenses.142 Although never explicitly 
overruled, the current status of the compelling interest test is 
in question following several important cases on the closely 
related expressive association doctrine.143  
B. The Compelled Association Doctrine 
Although not an enumerated right, the Supreme Court 
has found “implicit in the right to engage in activities protected 
by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate 
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”144 Without 
such protection for group effort, the Court reasoned, an 
individual’s other First Amendment freedoms would be 
significantly diminished.145 Just as the Court found that freedom 
  
 139 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658-59 (2000); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (the purpose of the First 
Amendment is to preserve a democratic form of government by ensuring government does 
not have the power to repress the public by coercing acceptance of a government approved 
message), overruled in part on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 140 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 
(1987) (“Even if the [public accommodations statute] does work some slight 
infringement on [the association’s] right of expressive association, that infringement is 
justified because it serves the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination 
against women.”); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“[A]cts of 
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and 
other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to 
prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, 
like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special 
harms distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no 
constitutional protection.”). 
 141 Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 2, at 238-40.  
 142 Willock v. Elane Photography, Inc., HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 17 
(N.M. Human Rights Comm’n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/ 
willockopinion.pdf. 
 143 Bernstein, supra note 138, at 116. 
 144 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
 145 Id. (“According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is 
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding 
dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
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of expression corresponded with a right to be free from compelled 
expression,146 so has the Court found a corresponding right of 
freedom from compelled association.147 Thus, the Court views the 
right of freedom of association as a necessary corollary to the 
enumerated First Amendment rights,148 and the compelled 
association doctrine is directly analogous to the compelled speech 
doctrine because the Court derived both from the same 
rationale.149 
The Supreme Court’s most significant freedom of 
association cases involve the application of state public 
accommodations laws to expressive activities that result in 
compelled association problems.150 The three most instructive 
cases in this area are Roberts v. United States Jaycees, Hurley 
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.151 
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees 
The United State Jaycees, a nonprofit educational and 
charitable membership organization, limited their regular 
membership to men ages eighteen to thirty-five.152 Women were 
admitted as nonvoting associate members only.153 In the mid-
1970s, two Minnesota chapters, St. Paul and Minneapolis, 
  
U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000) (“This right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing 
its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”). 
 146 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
 147 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 148 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
 149 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (explaining that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect against attempts of the government or a majority from imposing on 
a minority any “uniformity of sentiment”). 
 150 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 572-
73 (1995) (holding that the Massachusetts public accommodations law was 
unconstitutional as applied to the sponsor of Boston’s annual St. Patrick’s Day parade 
because the parade’s sponsor could not be compelled to include any group whose 
message would alter the expression of the parade as a whole); Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 
(finding unconstitutional the application of the New Jersey public accommodations law 
to a private non-profit civic and educational association because “[t]he forced inclusion 
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive 
association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability 
to advocate public or private viewpoints”); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (holding that the 
Minnesota public accommodations law infringed upon the civic organization’s First 
Amendment freedoms when it compelled the organization to admit women as 
members, but the infringement was justified because the burden on the members’ 
speech was incidental when compared with the State’s compelling interest in 
abolishing sex discrimination.). 
 151 Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Hurley, 515 U.S. 557; Dale, 530 U.S. 640. 
 152 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613. 
 153 Id. 
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began to admit women as regular voting members in violation 
of the organization’s bylaws.154 After the national organization 
imposed various sanctions and threatened to revoke the 
offending chapters’ charters, the chapters filed discrimination 
suits with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights.155 The 
local chapters alleged a violation of the Minnesota public 
accommodations law, which prohibited the denial to “any 
person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a 
place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, 
religion, disability, national origin or sex.”156  
Reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eight Circuit, the Supreme Court found that the Minnesota 
public accommodations law was constitutionally applied to the 
national organization to require the admission of women as full 
voting members.157 To reach that conclusion, the Court inquired 
whether applying this statute to the Jaycees would infringe 
upon the group’s First Amendment rights, and found there was 
no infringement because admitting women would not in any 
way impede the Jaycees from disseminating their views.158 
However, the Court clarified that a finding of infringement 
does not end the analysis; infringement on a group’s right to 
expressive association may be “justified by regulations adopted 
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”159 After 
this pronouncement, the Court quickly concluded that the 
compelling interest of eradicating sex discrimination served by 
Minnesota’s public accommodations law justified any imposition 
on the Jaycees.160  
2. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Group of Boston 
In Hurley, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
Massachusetts public accommodations law was unconstitutional 
  
 154 Id. at 614. 
 155 Sanctions included denying members of the offending chapters access to 
awards programs, not counting members’ votes at national conventions, and excluding 
members from office. Id. 
 156 MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subdiv. 3 (1982).  
 157 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. 
 158 Id. at 621-22, 627. 
 159 Id. at 623. 
 160 Id. 
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as applied to a private, unincorporated group that organized 
Boston’s yearly St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade.161 The 
private council of veterans was authorized to organize the yearly 
parade by Boston’s mayor in 1947.162 In 1992, the respondents 
formed the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual group of 
Boston (GLIB) in order to join the parade “to express pride in 
their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
individuals, to demonstrate that there are such men and 
women among those so descended, and to express their 
solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in New 
York’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade.”163 The council denied GLIB’s 
application to join the parade, but GLIB marched anyway 
pursuant to a state court order granting the group the right to 
participate.164 When GLIB’s application was denied again in 
1993, the group brought suit against the council under 
Massachusetts’s public accommodations law.165  
Like the analyses in the compelled speech cases, the 
Court first identified that there was expression involved 
entitled to First Amendment protection.166 It is important to 
note that although the parade did not have any specific 
message to convey, the Court held its expression was 
nevertheless protected.167 The fact that the organizers did not 
originate the message that each contingent expressed was not a 
reason for denying constitutional protection to the parade as a 
whole, because the mere act of selecting each piece for inclusion 
was sufficient to impart constitutional protection.168 A key part 
of the Court’s analysis involved a discussion of the history of 
public accommodations laws, and concluded that “[p]rovisions 
like these are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a 
legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of 
discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the 
First or Fourteenth Amendments.”169 Additionally, the Court 
  
 161 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995). 
 162 Id. at 560. 
 163 Id. at 561. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 568-69. 
 167 Id. at 569. 
 168 Id. at 570 (“Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection 
require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the 
communication. Cable operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech 
activities even when they only select programming originally produced by others.”).  
 169 Id. at 572.  
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found the statute at issue unproblematic, because it was neither 
directed at speech nor a content-based restriction of speech.170  
However, the Court found the statute was nevertheless 
unconstitutional as applied since it would compel the parade 
organizers to change the content of their expression.171 The 
Court explained that, “[s]ince every participating unit affects 
the message conveyed by the private organizers, the state 
courts’ application of the statute produced an order essentially 
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their 
parade.”172 The state improperly converted the organizers’ 
expression into the public accommodation, rather than apply 
the statute properly.173 A different result would have obtained 
had GLIB shown that the organizers excluded its members or 
other people from participating in the approved parade units 
on the basis of a protected classification (sexual orientation).174 
Rather, the issue was whether they could be excluded as a 
group because of their message.175 To apply a public 
accommodations statute in this manner infringes on an 
essential First Amendment principle, “that a speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”176  
The Hurley Court also explicitly rejected GLIB’s 
argument that the parade was merely a conduit for the 
participants’ messages, which does not have a right to free 
expression, rather than expression in and of itself.177 Finally, 
and most importantly, the Court conspicuously avoided all 
mention of the Roberts compelling interest analysis.178 In fact, 
  
 170 Id. (“Nor is this statute unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on its 
face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content, the focal point of its 
prohibition being rather on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision 
of publicly available goods, privileges, and services on the proscribed grounds.”). 
 171 Id. at 573.  
 172 Id. at 572-73.  
 173 Id. at 573. 
 174 Id. at 572. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 573.  
 177 Id. at 575.  
 178 Roberts v. United States Jaycees is cited by the Hurley Court only four 
times in the entire opinion, never once relying on the Roberts analysis: twice in the 
Court’s summary of the case’s previous history in the Massachusetts trial court and 
Supreme Judicial court (at 563 and 565); once for the proposition that public 
accommodations laws are generally constitutional (at 572); and a last time to support 
the Court’s distinguishing of a different compelled association case, New York State 
Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580. The lack of 
the Court’s reliance on Roberts left open two possible interpretations of the continued 
validity of Roberts. One possibility was that the Court felt expressive association 
deserved the same First Amendment protection as pure expression, in which case 
Roberts and its “compelling interest” test were essentially overruled. Alternatively, it 
could merely have signified that the Court saw Hurley as a pure expression case and, 
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the Court explicitly rejected the idea that a public 
accommodations law could be constitutionally applied to restrict 
expression and declared that, “While the law is free to promote 
all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to 
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an 
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however 
enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”179  
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale  
In Dale, the Supreme Court again considered whether a 
state public accommodations law could be constitutionally 
applied to compel association. This time the issue was whether 
New Jersey could apply its public accommodations law to 
compel a national nonprofit educational association to keep on 
as a member an individual whose message was at odds with the 
views the organization wished to express.180 After ten years as a 
model Boy Scout, James Dale’s application to become an adult 
member and assistant scout-master was approved.181 Shortly 
thereafter, Dale openly acknowledged his homosexuality, 
became involved with the on-campus Lesbian/Gay Alliance at 
his university, and gave an interview in a local newspaper 
discussing his efforts to address “homosexual teenagers’ need 
for gay role models.”182 Following publication of this interview, 
Dale’s adult membership in the Scouts was revoked.183 Dale 
sued under New Jersey’s public accommodations statute, which 
prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation on 
the basis of sexual orientation.184 
  
therefore, Roberts simply did not apply. In Dale, the Court resolved the confusion in 
favor of the first interpretation by clarifying that, where a First Amendment violation 
has been found in the expressive association context, Hurley, not Roberts, controls. Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000); Bernstein, supra note 138, at 118. 
 179 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579. This statement is not irreconcilable with Roberts. 
The Roberts analysis permitted application of a public accommodations law so long as 
the resulting infringement was “justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling 
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Thus, if a law interferes with speech for the sole 
purpose of promoting a state-sponsored message, the Court seems to imply by the 
above statement in Hurley, the law would not satisfy the “unrelated to the suppression 
of ideas” requirement of the Roberts standard. Id. Nevertheless, the Court did not 
apply the Roberts reasoning to Hurley.  
 180 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. 
 181 Id.  
 182 Id. at 645. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
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The Court began its analysis with the established 
principle that “forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a 
group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if 
the presence of that person affects in a significant way the 
group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”185 
Finding that the Boy Scouts of America was engaged in 
expression protected by the First Amendment, the Court then 
considered whether inclusion of an individual with contrary 
views would burden the organization’s expression.186 The Court 
found that it did.187  
At this point, rather than engaging in the Roberts 
compelling interest balancing analysis, the Court distinguished 
Roberts by deemphasizing the extent to which its holding relied 
upon the compelling interest test.188 The Court insisted the 
Roberts decision rested on the fact that no “serious burden on 
the male members’ freedom of expressive association” was 
demonstrated.189 Because the burden on the group’s First 
Amendment rights was not serious, it was proper to take the 
state’s interest in enforcing the statute into account.190 
However, in this case, applying the public accommodations 
statute to the Boy Scouts did infringe the group’s associational 
rights, and thus Hurley’s “traditional First Amendment 
analysis” controlled.191 Just as in Hurley, the state’s interest 
could not overcome the “severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ 
right to freedom of expressive association.”192  
Finally, in responding to an argument made by the 
dissenters, the Court took care to emphasize that the content of 
the Boy Scouts’ message did not influence the majority’s 
conclusion.193 The Court echoed Hurley, explaining that,  
[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s 
expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the 
organization to accept members where such acceptance would 
derogate from the organization’s expressive message. “While the law 
is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it 
is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than 
  
 185 Id. at 648. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 656.  
 188 Id. at 657-58; Bernstein, supra note 138, at 111. 
 189 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984). 
 190 Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-59 (the organization’s “interest in freedom of 
expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the other”). 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 661.  
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promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, 
however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”194 
Despite the fact that there were four dissenters, none of 
them appear to disagree with the majority over dropping the 
compelling interest analysis for cases where public 
accommodations law present First Amendment problems.195 
Rather, the dissenters disagreed with the majority over 
whether the association expressed a message, its rights were 
infringed, and its message impaired by compelling the group to 
keep Dale on as an employee.196 
4. The Compelled Association Doctrine Further 
Demonstrates a First Amendment Violation in Elane 
Photography 
By applying the principles that evolved in Roberts, 
Hurley, and Dale, it is evident that the New Mexico public 
accommodations statute cannot be constitutionally applied to 
Elane Photography.197  
a. Roberts Distinguished 
Even if Roberts remains good law, which has been 
questioned after Hurley and Dale,198 its reasoning cannot be 
applied to Elane Photography. Although the Court found the 
Jaycees engaged in protected expression, there was “no basis in 
the record for concluding that admission of women as full 
voting members will impede the organization’s ability to 
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its 
preferred views.”199 In Elane Photography, however, application 
of the New Mexico statute would directly impede Huguenin’s 
ability to disseminate her preferred views; it would force the 
photographer to affirm and possibly even endorse an ideology200 
  
 194 Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 
557, 579 (1995)).  
 195 Id. at 665; Bernstein, supra note 138, at 125-26. 
 196 Bernstein, supra note 138, at 124-26. 
 197 Eugene Volokh, The Breadth of the New Mexico Human Rights Commission’s 
Rationale, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 15, 2008, 1:48 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/04/ 
15/the-breadth-of-the-new-mexico-human-rights-commissions-rationale/. 
 198 Bernstein, supra note 138, at 124.  
 199 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984). Many 
commentators take issue with the Court’s assertion that admitting women to an all 
male organization would not materially alter that organization’s stance on social or 
political issues. Bernstein, supra note 138, at 97.  
 200 See supra Part II.A.3.a.  
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that she claims she sincerely believes is wrong.201 For this 
reason, Elane Photography more closely resembles Hurley and 
Dale, where the Court found direct and severe intrusions on 
the groups’ First Amendment rights.202  
b. Hurley and Dale Control the Outcome of Elane 
Photography 
In Hurley, the Court began its investigation into whether 
application of the Massachusetts public accommodations law 
violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights with the 
observation that the statute had been applied to the parade “in a 
peculiar way.”203 Rather than seeking access to the parade as 
participants in the organizers’ message, the group sought to 
have their own message included as part of the parade over the 
organizers’ objections.204 This application of the statute “had the 
effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public 
accommodation.”205 To condone such an application of the statute 
would eviscerate the axiomatic First Amendment principle “that 
a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own 
message.”206 To apply the New Mexico statute to Huguenin’s 
photographs would have the same unconstitutional effect of co-
opting expression itself as the public accommodation, rather 
than the retail photography service Huguenin provides.  
Also in Hurley, the Court explicitly found that no 
individual petitioner was excluded from participation in the 
parade; the petitioners were only excluded to the extent they 
sought to alter the parade sponsors’ message.207 Similarly, 
there was no showing the Huguenins denied service to 
individuals on discriminatory grounds.208 Rather, the 
Huguenins asserted, they purposefully selected the content of 
their photographs so that their expression did not promote 
activities that conflict with their beliefs.209 For example, the 
  
 201 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights 
Comm’n at 2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock (N.M.2d Jud. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.scottfillmer.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ElanePhotoAppeal.pdf. 
 202 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
 203 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 573. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights 
Comm’n, at 2, Elane Photography, LLC. 
 209 Id. 
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Huguenins claim they refuse to take any “photographs that 
present abortion or horror movies or pornography in a 
favorable light.”210 Thus the Huguenins, like the parade 
organizers in Hurley, were merely exercising their First 
Amendment right to select the content of their expression and 
not discriminating in providing service on an impermissible 
basis.211  
The district court attempted to distinguish Hurley by 
arguing that Huguenin’s free speech rights were not implicated 
because her own message was not being co-opted.212 Rather, the 
district court claimed that Huguenin was merely “a conduit or 
an agent for its clients.”213 This counterargument was rejected 
by the court in Hurley and should be rejected here as well.214 
Huguenin asserts that she does not simply point and shoot her 
camera to convey her “client’s message of a day well spent.”215 
The court need not take her word for it; it stands to reason that 
this assertion must be at least partially true. If anyone could 
arrange the composition, lighting, and angles of a photograph, 
and if there was only one possible way to take a picture such 
that only one possible picture of any give scene existed, no one 
would ever hire a professional photographer. But arranging 
composition, lighting, and angles is not always a simple matter, 
and there are an infinite number of possible pictures to take. 
Thus, there must be at least some skill and selection to the 
process that makes the district court’s conduit analogy 
inappropriate. The selection of what to include and how to 
include it is more like the parade organizers exercise of 
editorial control over the content of the parade “upon which the 
State can not intrude.”216 In fact, Huguenin’s control over her 
photographs may be even greater than the organizer’s control 
over the parade because Elane Photography explicitly retains 
the rights to all photographs taken.217 Thus, the “conduit” 
analogy is inappropriately applied to Elane Photography.218 
  
 210 Id. 
 211 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570. 
 212 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, CV-2008-06632, 11 (N.M.2d Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 11 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-
LLC-v-Vanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009.  
 213 Willock, CV-2008-06632, at 11.  
 214 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
 215 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights 
Comm’n, at 1-2, Elane Photography, LLC; see also Willock, CV-2008-06632, at 11.  
 216 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
 217 Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 4 (N.M. 
Human Rights Comm’n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf. 
 218 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. 
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Because both speakers exercise control over the content of their 
messages, coercing inclusion of a message not their own would 
cause the resulting expression to be perceived as “worthy of 
presentation and quite possibly of support.”219 As already 
explained, such a consequence would run afoul of the First 
Amendment in the most dangerous way.220 
Similarly, in Dale, the Court confirmed that where 
application of a public accommodations law would significantly 
burden First Amendment rights, the Court should apply 
traditional First Amendment analysis rather than the 
compelling interest balancing of Roberts.221 Thus, once a “severe 
intrusion” on First Amendment rights was identified, the Court 
found the infringement could not be justified, even by the 
state’s interest in enforcing its public accommodations law.222 
Because the Boy Scouts believed Dale’s views were 
“inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth 
members,” forcing the organization to include him would 
“surely interfere with the Boy Scout’s choice not to propound a 
point of view contrary to its beliefs.”223 The Huguenins asserted 
that they held a similar belief,224 which if sincerely held, leads 
to a direct First Amendment infringement since they would be 
forced to promote or at least portray in a positive light ideas 
inconsistent with those beliefs. 
The Court’s opinion in Dale is interesting for deferring 
to the Boy Scouts views regarding its own expression, declining 
to investigate into either “the nature of its expression” or the 
group’s “view of what would impair its expression.”225 Deferring 
to the organization claiming infringement certainly makes the 
analysis in difficult cases simpler. There would have been two 
opinions in favor of Elane Photography had the Human Rights 
Commission and the district court deferred to Huguenin’s 
assertions that she “believes that she implicitly endorses the 
  
 219 Id.  
 220 Id. at 576 (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced 
upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s 
right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”). 
 221 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 654. 
 224 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights Comm’n 
at 2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. June 
30, 2008), available at http://www.scottfillmer.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ 
ElanePhotoAppeal.pdf. 
 225 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
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viewpoints communicated by her photography,”226 and that it 
“compels Elane Photography to participate in and advance a 
viewpoint it would not do so absent government coercion.”227 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Dale, criticized this deference 
as “an astounding view of the law”228 that will lead to nothing 
less than “a free pass out of antidiscrimination laws.”229 Yet, it 
is probably necessary to sufficiently protect First Amendment 
rights. As the Supreme Court unanimously stated in Hurley, “a 
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection.”230 Requiring an individual to have 
developed beliefs and already expressed them, either in writing 
or through other expressive means, may not be sufficiently 
protective of Free Speech.231 Nevertheless, the facts of Elane 
Photography do not require so much deference that plausibility 
is strained. It is not unreasonable to infer that a religious 
individual sincerely holds beliefs at odds with those that would 
be promoted by participating in and helping to celebrate a 
same-sex wedding.  
Finally, neither Hurley nor Dale can be distinguished on 
the grounds that the cases involved First Amendment 
infringements on nonprofit organizations, while Elane 
Photography is a for-profit business. First of all, and most 
obviously, the United States Jaycees is also a nonprofit 
organization.232 Thus, even if Elane Photography could be 
distinguished from Hurley and Dale on this basis, Roberts 
would be similarly distinguished. Moreover, the organizations 
in all three cases were either expressly or impliedly deemed to 
be public accommodations.233 Thus, since Elane Photography 
was also a public accommodation, the fact that it was a for-
profit business is irrelevant. Lastly, the Dale Court clearly 
explains that the distinguishing factor between applying 
Roberts, on one hand, and Hurley on the other, is whether the 
  
 226 Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the N.M. Human Rights Comm’n 
at 2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct June 
30, 2008), available at http://www.scottfillmer.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ 
ElanePhotoAppeal.pdf. 
 227 Id. at 5. 
 228 Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 229 Id. at 688. 
 230 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 559, 569 (1995). 
 231 For an excellent argument of this point see Epstein, supra note 126, at 126-31.  
 232 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).  
 233 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 
(2000) (majority opinion). In Hurley, the Court specified that the parade’s expression 
was not a public accommodation, but assumed that the parade itself was a public 
accommodation. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579. 
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First Amendment has been infringed.234 As demonstrated, 
applying the New Mexico public accommodations law did 
infringe the Huguenins’ First Amendment rights. Thus, the 
Hurley and Dale First Amendment analysis applies, under 
which the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination 
through enforcing public accommodations laws cannot justify 
the violation of the Huguenins’ rights.235  
III. PROPOSALS 
Elane Photography is a difficult case because it raises 
sensitive issues that strike at the heart of the moral and 
religious beliefs of a great many people. It is important to 
remember that the substance of the expression in cases like 
these is legally irrelevant.236 As the Court’s admonition at the 
end of Dale makes clear, “[t]he First Amendment protects 
expression, be it of the popular variety or not.”237 Indeed, a 
main purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the nation 
from government efforts to coerce unity of thought, because to 
do so is the first step toward destroying our democratic system 
of government.238 However, the significant purpose of the states 
in promulgating public accommodations laws—protecting the 
dignity and rights of access of all citizens—cannot be 
abandoned. The following suggestions are three possible ways 
to preserve public accommodations laws without significantly 
impairing their ability to curb discrimination while at the same 
time reducing the possibility of First Amendment violations on 
expressive businesses. 
One obvious solution is to simply revert to a more 
narrow definition of “public accommodation” to exclude 
expressive businesses. A good definition that would help to 
limit the conflict between such laws and the Constitution 
comes from the “public character” rationale behind public 
accommodations laws.239 As Pamela Griffon explains,  
The public character idea reflects the rationale for common law 
regulation of inns and common carriers. The owner of such facilities was 
  
 234 Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-59. 
 235 Id. at 659. 
 236 Bernstein, supra note 138, at 125 n.222. 
 237 Dale, 530 U.S. at 660. 
 238 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“[W]e set 
up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power 
any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by 
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.”). 
 239 Griffin, supra note 4, at 1054. 
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deemed to be engaged in “quasi-public” service, because the property 
was put to a use in which the public had an interest. . . . Under this 
view, the purpose of restaurants, theatres and hotels is the public 
purpose of making a profit, which indicates that all paying customers 
will be accepted. In this context, racial or other discrimination among 
customers is unreasonable because such differences are irrelevant to the 
purpose for which the facilities operate.240  
This rationale supports defining public accommodation 
as “an establishment in which minimal association exists 
between proprietor and customers, and in which the service 
relation is brief, casual and routine. In addition, the 
establishment provides a service necessary to the public, and a 
high degree of competition exists among establishments of the 
same kind.”241 Alaska’s public accommodation definition is not a 
bad example of one that strikes a nice balance between the 
competing interests at stake. That statute limits its scope to 
a place that caters or offers its services, goods, or facilities to the 
general public and includes a public inn, restaurant, eating house, 
hotel, motel, soda fountain, soft drink parlor, tavern, night club, 
roadhouse, place where food or spiritous or malt liquors are sold for 
consumption, trailer park, resort, campground, barber shop, beauty 
parlor, bathroom, resthouse, theater, swimming pool, skating rink, 
golf course, cafe, ice cream parlor, transportation company, and all 
other public amusement and business establishments, subject only 
to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable 
alike to all persons.242 
The list of enumerated businesses is inclusive enough to 
cover most situations and to promote inclusion of all people in 
most places. It is true that some of the places listed could be 
expressive in nature, especially because the list is left open by 
the clause on the end extending the definition to “all other 
amusement and business establishments.” However, the entire 
definition is conveniently qualified by any “conditions and 
limitations established by law,” which thereby automatically 
limits the statute to its constitutionally permitted scope, as 
interpreted by Hurley and Dale, which prohibits application of 
these statutes where First Amendment rights are infringed. 
Although the Constitution automatically limits all state 
statutes, adding an explicit qualifying clause allows an 
interpreting court to avoid having to strike down the entire 
statute on a facial challenge, thereby permitting a fluid 
  
 240 Id. at 1054-55. 
 241 Id. at 1055. 
 242 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(16) (2012). 
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definition of expressive business to develop slowly and 
thoughtfully over time without undermining the important 
equal access goals the statutes further.  
Constructions to be avoided are those like California’s, 
which evades the problem of definition altogether by 
prohibiting discrimination “in all business establishments of 
every kind whatsoever;”243 and those like New Jersey’s statute, 
which lists, but does not limit its scope to, more than sixty 
types of businesses, public places and institutions, including 
“any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail 
shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or 
services of any kind.”244 
This solution is neither perfect nor original. It is not 
perfect because it leaves the dirty job of line drawing to the 
courts on a case-by-case basis. Although, as mentioned earlier, 
this buys the courts time to develop a workable test for when a 
business is expressive and for achieving a better balance 
between the important goals of public accommodations law and 
the foundational right of free speech, it also leaves room for 
inconsistent application of the law.  
The proposal is not original because a similar solution 
was recently suggested by James Gottry, as part of a more 
comprehensive two-pronged approach to alleviating the conflict 
between the First Amendment and public accommodations 
laws.245 The first prong of Gottry’s solution suggested that 
public accommodations laws should be legislatively narrowed 
in scope, both in term of the types of businesses they cover and 
the classes of people they protect.246 The second prong 
suggested that courts take an active role in avoiding 
constitutional conflicts by interpreting statutes narrowly, and by 
engaging in a more robust analysis by 1) inquiring whether 
there in fact is discrimination of a class denying access to the 
business or service, rather than a decision not to express an 
antithetical point of view; 2) investigating whether there in fact 
is expression involved; 3) investigating the quality of 
  
 243 CAL CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2010). 
 244 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 2010). 
 245 James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-
Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 961, 996-97 (2011). 
 246 Id. at 997. 
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expression;247 and 4) applying Hurley to balance states’ interests 
against any First Amendment infringement found.248  
This proposal raises several issues that require comment. 
First, as suggested above, narrowing the scope of public 
accommodations laws to more traditional common carriers and 
purveyors of necessary services is supported by the historical 
purpose of the law, and it helps avoid major First Amendment 
conflicts. However, limiting the suspect classes protected by 
public accommodations does not serve both these goals. The 
historical purpose of the law is not served because a blind 
adherence to the text of the original civil rights statutes, which 
protected only race, fails to do justice to the fundamental 
principle of equality upon which this nation is built and which 
has been recognized by many states as evidenced by the 
addition of gender, national origin, marital status and sexual 
orientation as protected classes in their public accommodations 
statutes.249 Second, restricting the scope of the protected classes 
does not help avoid First Amendment conflicts. National debates 
on race and gender are far from resolved. Even if public 
accommodations laws were restricted to protect the two least 
controversial “suspect classes,” the risk of First Amendment 
violations for expressive business would remain huge. 
Restricting the coverage of suspect classes would therefore both 
undermine the principles of equality on which historical public 
accommodations laws were based and fail to avoid the essential 
conflict between those laws and the First Amendment.  
The second prong of the proposal is vulnerable to the 
same criticism as the first proposed solution above, which 
restricts only business types—it would require endless 
litigation and factual analysis of what types of businesses are 
expressive.250 This is a daunting proposition considering the 
vast array of artistic businesses that are potentially 
expressive—for example, custom baked goods,251 theme party 
  
 247 It is universally understood that certain types of speech are entitled to 
more First Amendment protection than others. See supra notes 107, 114 (explaining 
that political speech is the essence of speech afforded First Amendment protection).  
 248 See Gottry, supra note 245, at 1000-02. 
 249 See supra note 6.  
 250 But see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 635 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting a 
standard to distinguish between expressive and non-expressive associations).  
 251 Baked goods may already be a problem. For several years in a row, a 
ShopRite in New Jersey declined to provide a birthday cake inscribed with the name of 
a young boy called Adolf Hitler Campbell. See 3-Year-Old Hitler Can’t Get Name on 
Cake, MSNBC (Dec. 17, 2008, 6:40 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28269290/ns/ 
us_news-weird_news/t/-year-old-hitler-cant-get-name-cake/. 
2012] FOR SALE 1551 
 
planning services, or calligraphers for hire. If sorting through 
these, one business at a time, is not difficult enough, the issue 
becomes further complicated by the fact that it is very difficult to 
identify instances of expressive activity without a preexisting 
identifiable message.252 Elane Photography exemplifies this 
issue. After determining that Huguenin herself expressed no 
particular message of her own through her photographs, the 
district court found her First Amendment rights were not 
burdened by having to express someone else’s message.253 But 
the court has stated and reaffirmed that there need not be an 
identifiable message in order to constitute expression.254 All that 
is required is expressive activity,255 which could be anything.  
The second proposal’s guidelines for determining 
whether expression exists do not help make this analysis any 
easier. Those guidelines suggest that courts follow the 
standard set out in Texas v. Johnson256 for identifying 
expression. The Johnson test asks whether there is an intent to 
convey a particularized message, and whether it is likely that 
viewers would understand the message being conveyed.257 That 
standard will not aid the courts because it was developed to 
identify expression conveyed via conduct—for example, the 
symbolic act of burning a flag, which is distinct from the more 
conventional modes of expression through utterance or modes 
akin to utterance.258 Indeed, the Court’s failure to apply that 
standard in Dale or Hurley emphasizes its inapplicability to cases 
involving utterance or analogous expression. Elane Photography 
demonstrates the difference—Huguenin does not intend to make 
a statement by the act of taking or refusing to take a photograph; 
rather, the photographs themselves are the expression. There is 
no magic formula for identifying an expressive business, and at 
the same time, a case-by-case development will necessarily entail 
a long and bumpy road.  
  
 252 See Epstein, supra note 126, at 126-27.  
 253 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, CV-2008-06632, 11 (N.M.2d Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-
LLC-v-Vanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009. 
 254 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (organizations need not 
be organized for the purpose of expounding a message to be protected: “An association 
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to 
protection”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(“a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection”). 
 255 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
 256 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 257 Id. at 404. 
 258 Id. at 402-03. 
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A third possible solution avoids the difficulties of 
distinguishing between expressive and nonexpressive businesses 
altogether. Professor Richard Epstein believes it is nearly 
impossible to draw the line between expressive and nonexpressive 
businesses, but after Dale, there is no need to.259 All that is 
required for constitutional protection is that a business “engages 
in expressive activity that could be impaired.”260 Epstein argues 
that the epitome of a nonexpressive business—“the profit-making 
corporation that ships goods, provides services, and cares only for 
its bottom line”—is a caricature that no real business fits.261 
Corporations today have corporate cultures that help win the 
loyalty and approval of both employees and clients.262 These 
corporate identities are built through expressive activity, whether 
by donating to causes, participating in community service 
projects, taking voluntary environmental protection measures, or 
conducting employee health initiatives.263 This means that the 
Dale standard for expressive activity is always met, because all 
organizations engage in expressive activity by building their 
corporate identity.264  
In addition to his argument that it is meaningless to 
draw lines between expressive and nonexpressive businesses, 
Epstein contends that no legal basis exists for government 
control over decisions of private individuals to discriminate in 
providing goods or services.265 Further, he makes the case that 
in developed private markets there is no need for it, since 
“voluntary segmentation of population groups” may be 
beneficial for their members, and people may prefer it.266  
This does not, however, mean that discrimination by 
anyone, anywhere is okay; there are still compelling 
justifications for upholding public accommodations laws in at 
least one class of business.267 Where there is no possibility for 
voluntary segmentation antidiscrimination laws may be 
justified.268 That is, wherever a business holds a monopoly 
position in the market, and people cannot benefit from the 
social and economic efficiencies that result from voluntary 
  
 259 Epstein, supra note 126, at 139-40. 
 260 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
 261 Epstein, supra note 126, at 139. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. at 140. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 133. 
 266 Id. at 134. 
 267 Id. at 121. 
 268 Id. at 136. 
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organizing into internally coherent groups, the government 
should apply public accommodations laws to protect against 
the economic and social harms that monopolies have the 
disproportionate power to cause.269 Thus, public 
accommodations laws should only apply to government 
institutions, which have a monopoly as a matter of law,270 and 
other essential businesses that “typically supply standard 
commodities—electrical power, telephone service, railroad 
transportation—and only work because the firm is largely 
indifferent to the identity and personal characteristics of its 
customers.”271 Recognizing the major weakness in this theory, 
Epstein points out that the main problem with his suggestion 
will be defining what exactly constitutes a monopoly.272 This is 
complicated not just by the haziness of characteristics that 
imply monopoly status—stable, long term, and having minimal 
competition—but also the difficulty of identifying the 
geographic scope of the business, and the relevant market that 
should underlie the analysis.  
None of the theories discussed in this section provide a 
magic antidote to the conflicts raised by Elane Photography. 
Nevertheless, identifying the common ground among them may 
help illuminate potential areas of future reform. All of the 
theories discussed agree with the basic proposition that the 
application of public accommodations laws to businesses that 
provide standard or essential services and have no reason to 
distinguish between their customers on the basis of any personal 
characteristics would not violate the First Amendment.273 That, 
at least, is a start. All three theories would probably also agree 
that the application of public accommodations laws to businesses 
where the provider-consumer interaction is “brief, casual and 
routine” are similarly unlikely to be sites of frequent First 
Amendment infractions. In all other types of businesses, the 
presence of expression will serve as a threshold issue that will 
likely do most of the “work” in the First Amendment analysis. 
This is because once expression is found, it is comparatively 
simple to determine whether the expression has been coerced or 
would be altered by the application of a public accommodations   
 269 Id.  
 270 Id. at 121. 
 271 Id. at 137. 
 272 Id. at 121. 
 273 Griffin, supra note 4, at 1055; Gottry, supra note 245, at 997, 965-68 
(recommending a return to the historical contours of public accommodations laws, 
which limited their scope to “essential goods and services”); Epstein, supra note 126, at 
137. 
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statute; and if there is no expression, there is no problem. 
Perhaps the best (but likely not ideal) solution then is to focus on 
when a business is engaging in expression in a particular 
circumstance, rather than whether it is an expressive business as 
a matter of law. The precise standard will have to be developed 
over time, likely through some sort of imprecise totality of the 
circumstances analysis. This instance-focused approach (in 
contrast to the approaches that focus on definitions of expressive 
businesses above) gives more consideration to the high values of 
equality and access that public accommodations laws serve, while 
protecting First Amendment values as well. It also takes into 
account the fact that similar behavior may be found to be 
expressive in some circumstances and not in others, even if done by 
the same person.274 Although this method will also result in case by 
case doctrinal development, perhaps a factual approach will 
eventually lead to more clarity in the law. In the meantime, 
statutory definitions of public accommodations need not be 
completely rewritten. A simple qualification, like Alaska’s, that the 
definition is subject “to the conditions and limitations established 
by law”275 will allow the doctrine to unfold in the courts.  
Elane Photography may be one of the first cases to 
highlight the tension between public accommodations laws and 
the First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech, 
but it will not be the last. One can easily imagine, for example, 
that the development of new technology and the rise of social 
media as a commercialize-able form of expression will lead to 
an infinite number of possible First Amendment violations. But 
these new issues reflect old problems, and it is appropriate to 
look to old wisdom for guidance. Justice Brandeis once opined 
that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution “believed that freedom 
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; 
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.”276 The 
best way to fight “invidious discrimination” in expressive 
  
 274 For example, photography may not always be automatically determined to 
be expressive. A photographer who takes private jobs, plays an active part in staging 
her photographs and exercises judgment in choosing lighting, perspective, and 
composition is not the same as an employee of a Sears photography studio, which is a 
large national chain, characterized by general openness to the public whose employees 
likely have little discretion in discharging their responsibilities.  
 275 See supra note 242. 
 276 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
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businesses is, therefore, through means that encourage more 
speech and discussion and not through speech restrictions.  
Susan Nabet† 
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